The notion of an inductive inference machine aggregating a team of inference machines models the problem of making use of several explanations for a single phenomenon. This article investigates the amount of information necessary for a successful aggregation of the theories given by a team of inference machines. Variations of using different kinds of identitication and aggregation are investigated. (0
INTRODUCTION
This article is supplementary to a paper entitled "Aggregating Inductive Expertise" by Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein (1986) where they investigate inductive inference of recursively enumerable languages and classes of total recursive functions by teams of inference machines which are supervised by a chief.
Here we deal with inference of partial and total recursive functions, with questions of preserving special inference strategies of the team machines for the chief machine, and with some specific ways of inferring by the chief. Not only were the conceptual ideas taken from Osherson et al. (1986) , but also most of the proofs rely heavily on those given by Osherson et al., especially those using a contradiction to Rice's theorem.
An inductive inference machine works as follows: from time to time it receives instances of a problem (e.g., words of a language, values of a function) and outputs hypotheses for a description of the problem (e.g., a finite description of the language (grammar), a Giidel number of the function). The machine correctly identifies a problem if, given a potentially infinite sequence of instances which completely describes the problem, it converges to a hypothesis which is a correct description of the problem after finitely many steps. This model of "identification in the limit" was first introduced by Gold (1967) . Fundamental ideas and results are presented by Blum and Blum (1975) and by Case and Smith (1983) . Angluin and Smith (1982) give a survey of theory and methods in the inductive inference field. 139
Aggregation of inductive expertise formalizes the following situation: consider a number of inference machines, say three, working independently on the same sequence of input data, and successively computing hypotheses hopefully explaining the input. We call this collection of independent machines a team, as Smityh does in (Smith, 1982) . But while he defines identification by a team as successful identification by at least one team machine, here the majority of the team members has to correctly identify the input (Osherson et al., 1986) .
A team of inference machines working on the same problem is aggregated by a team head if the inference machine constituting the aggregator always identifies the problem if the majority of the team members do so. The aggregator's performance for different kinds of information transfer between himself and the team members is investigated. It seems that this model is closer to the intuitive concept of team-work than the approach in (Smith, 1982) , which rather relates to distributed systems. Add to this that without a team head the team has to agree about its aggregation mechanism.
In the first section of this paper we present a formal definition of the aggregation problem. Some results concerning the aggregation of teams of inference machines identifying partial or total recursive functions are given in the second section. We then investigate the question of whether special strategy types of the team machines can be preserved for the aggregator, i.e., whether it is possible to find an aggregator using a special inference strategy if all the team members are using a strategy of the same kind. Here we extend the preservation methods presented in (Osherson et al., 1986) to non-uniform strategies which aggregate special kinds of inference machines only. In the fourth section two more general kinds of identification (with errors, non-converging sequence of hypotheses) are introduced. For these kinds of identification we examine the aggregation problem under aggravated conditions. For simplicity, all the theorems presented in these sections are proved for teams with three members. But with the exception of one theorem they also hold for teams with n members, n > 3. Therefore in the fifth section we give examples for the generalization of the results to teams with n members.
I. PRELIMINARIES
To begin with, we introduce the notation used in the following. Let N be the set (0, 1,2, . ..} of natural numbers, and let ( , ): N2 + N be a standard pairing function. P" and !R" denote the classes of all partial recursive resp. total recursive functions of n variables. For n = 1 we also omit the upper index, We abbreviate "partial recursive function" by "p.r.f." (qi)ie N denotes an arbitray Godel numbering of the partial recursive functions. (@Jis N denotes a Blum complexity measure (Blum, 1967 ) associated with ((PiliEN. By cpi,,(x) we denote the result received after n steps of the computation of cp on x; i.e., if Gi(x) <n then cpi,,(x) = q,(x), otherwise cpi.,(x) is not defined. For cp E P and x E N q(x) 1 means that q(x) is defined, and cp(x)t means that q(x) is not defined. dom(cp) and rng(cp) denote the domain resp. the range of cp. graph(q) := {(x, I&X)) 1 x E dom(cp)} is called the graph of 9. For 9, $ E P we define rp E $ :o graph(q) c graph($). DEFINITION 1.1. For cp E P we call @ an enumeration of cp iff @ = (a,, aI, . . . . a,,, . . . ) is an infinite sequence with (1) (Vie N) a,E(N u {*}), h w ere ai = * means that no element of cp is enumerated at step i
ai= (x, y).
For Us P we call 0 the set of all enumerations of functions in U. For an arbitrary but fixed enumeration of 4pi~ P, q,, denotes the subset of graph(cp,) established after n steps of the enumeration. U(M) is the maximal set identifiable by A4, EX(M) := { U E P 1 U is identifable by M}, EX := { U c P 1 U is identifiable by some M}.
The term "EX" (explainable) has been introduced by Case and Smith (1978) .
The p.r.f. M: C+ IV is called an (inductive) inference machine, abbreviated by IIM. In the following we will use the notation M[a] to denote the sequence of outputs of the inference machine A4 on the input Q E C if M(a) is defined, i.e.,
otherwise.
Furthermore, we get an enumeration I of all inference machines by a Godel numbering cp using a bijective recursive enumeration c: C -+ N, namely Now we extend the definition of "identification by an inference machine" to "identification by a team of inference machines," where a team consists of three inference machines M;, M,, and M,, denoted by (i, j, k) E fV3. DEFINITION 1.3. Let (i, j, k) E N3, @E p, and U c P'. (i, j, k) identifies 4 iff (4 (VnE NJ Mi($Cnl)l, Mj(GCnl)l, MdGCnl)l and (b) at ieast two of the machines Ml, M,, Mk identify $.
identifies cp}, EX(i, j, k) := { UZ P 1 (i, j, k) identifies U}, and T-EX := { U c P 13 (i, j, k) E N3 with (i, j, k) identifies U}.
A team of inference machines ihentifies a partial recursive function cp if the majority of the team members identifies cp, but we do not know which of the machines work successfully. So in order to make use of the hypotheses given by the team members we need a supervising inference machine, defined as follows: DEFINITION 1.4. Let (i, j, k) E N3, U E P, and M and IIM. M aggregates (i, j, k) on U iff, VP E U, (i, j, k) identifies cp * M identities cp.
M then is called the aggregator of (i, j, k) on U.
In order to come up with a hypothesis M(o) the aggregator M needs information about the team machines' work. We distinguish four kinds of information, called "recent," "pure," "hypothesis," and "program." If the aggregator has to get along with "recent" information he will at step n see the most recent hypothesis given by each team member. In the case of "pure" information he will see all the hypotheses given by the team members up to step n. Information of the kind "hypothesis" contains all the hypotheses of the team members as well as the input sequence rr given so far. If the aggregator gets "program" information he knows the input CT and the programs of the team members themselves. The four kinds of information are formally defined as follows:
In the following INF,(i, j, k, a) denotes the respective information for one quadruple (i, j, k, C) and A E (recent, pure, hypothesis, program}. Using a function 19 which hands over the information to the aggregator, we can now make Definition 1.4 more precise: As an aggregator can simulate another aggregator getting less information, for all Us P obviously [recent, U] The following theorem says that there is an inference machine M which is able to aggregate each team on P' if M gets information of the kind "hypothesis" about the work of the team members. Osherson et al. (1986) already have shown the corresponding result for aggregation on R:
Proof: We present a stepwise defined strategy 0: C* + N. Using this strategy, an inference machine M can aggregate each team (i, j, k) E N on P. 6 tries to find two converging team members which do not contradict the input function cp E P, i.e., whose limit hypotheses denote functions not contradicting cp. In going from R to P, the problem is that such a team member actually might converge to a hypothesis which denotes a subfunction of the input function, But as one of these team members must identify cp, the function v E R* of Lemma 2.1 helps to find a correct hypothesis.
At step n, let g :
Step 1. B(o,, cr,, ITS, a) := v(last(a,), last(a,)). Goto step 2.
Step n> 1.
Case 1. One team member contradicts the input sequence o; i.e., there are x, y, ZEN, y#z, (x,~)~rng(o), and for some I~{i,j,k}, (x3 zi E VM,(o,,n. Then @a,, cl, cr2, a) := u(M,(a), M,(a)), for p #q # l#p, P, qE {i,j, k).
Case 2. Not case 1.
(a) One team member changes its hypothesis in this step; i.e., for some1E {i,j, k},M,(o)#M,(o-).Thene ((r,, (ri, ez, a) 
(b) Not case (a); i.e., tlf~ {i,j, k), M,(a)=M,(o-). Then 8th 6 5 u):=qu&,u, ,u;,u ).
Goto step n + 1. We show that 8 does the job. Let (i, j, k)E N3, and let $E @i, j, k). Consider the following cases: (A) All the three team machines converge. Then after some step no case Z(a) cannot occur any more. If thereafter case 1 arises, then henceforth it must occur always, and M, and M, must identify $, because M, obviously does not. If case 1 does not arise, then all the team machines converge to functions that do not contradict the input function. At most one of them may be a subfunction of 40. Therefore 8 also identifies (p' according to Lemma 2.1.
(B) One team machine M, diverges. Then the other two machines Mp and M, must correctly identify 3, and after some step no in either of the cases 1 or 2(a) u(M,, M,) will be a correct index for q. 1 Theorem 2.2 also follows from a result presented by Pitt and Smith (1988) . They have studied the relation between teams of inference machines and probabilistic inference machines, i.e., inference machines which identify a problem with a given probability. Pitt and Smith show that in general each team of inference machines can be aggregated by a single machine iff identification by a team of inference machines is defined as identification by a majority of the team members, in contrast to other definitions where only some team members have to identify the input.
COROLLARY 2.3. EX = T-EX.
Proof EX c T-EX because U E EX by U E U(M,) can be identified by the team (i, i, i). T-EXE EX follows from Theorem 2.2. 1 Osherson, Stob, and Weinstein (1986) have shown that for UE IF! already aggregation of the type "pure" suffices to supervise all teams (i, j, k) E N3; i.e., N3 E [pure, IR]. This results from the fact that for cp E R two machines can output contradicting hypotheses only if one of them already contradicts the input function cp. However, for rp E P two hypotheses may contradict outside the domain of cp: THEOREM 2.4 (Schafer-Richter, 1986). N3$ [pure, [Fp] .
Proof
Let 8: C3 + N be the strategy of a given inference machine M. We have to show that there is a team (i, j, k)~ N which M cannot aggregate on P if in every step M does not know more than the hypotheses so far computed by the team members.
If 8 is not a total function there is nothing to prove, since any strictly partial function 8 cannot aggregate a team (i, j, k) meeting one of B's domain gaps with some initial sequence of hypotheses and then converging, therefore identifying at least one function. So in the following we can assume that 0 is a total recursive function.
We define functions cp,, (Pi E P and a team (i, j, k) In the following definition of Mk, ui denotes a string of i consecutive ds.
Step 1. Va EC with lb(a) = 1 let Mk(g) := a, h(1) := @a, b, a). Goto step 2.
Step n> 1. Let aEC of length n, h(n-1) :
Case 2. Not case 1, then M,(a) :=M,(a-). Goto step n+ 1. Now, on each input $5, M, converges to a, and Mj converges to 6. We assume that Ao.
converges to a hypothesis h; i.e., there is an m E N such that (tm am) h(n) = h(m). Otherwise A4 does not identify any function but the team always identifies the function which everywhere is zero, but on argument 0 is undefined.
If case 1 occurs infinitely often, then it will always occur after some step n,. Therefore either Mk converges to u and the team identifies qa, or A4 converges to b and the team identifies qb. But cp, g (Ph in the first case, and qb g qh in the second case. If case 2 occurs infinitely often, then M, converges either to a or to b, but qh diverges on argument 0. Therefore the inference machine A4 identifies neither q0 nor (Pi. 1 Furthermore, Osherson et al. (1986) show that IV3 # [recent, R], from which it follows that [recent, R] c [pure, R] . We now present the analogous result for aggregation on P, using their proof idea. Proof. In (Osherson et al., 1986) it is shown that the set S, u S2 u S, r$ [recent, W], with s, = {(e, e, f(n))ln~ N}, &= ~(e~f(n)~f(n))ln~~)7 and
where (VGEC) M,(a) = a for an arbitrary (P,E R. Moreover, for the functions f, g, h E R it holds that for all n E N l vhcn) E K and phcn) = cp iff cp,Gcp,,
and if lh( g) is even, else.
From the result in (Osherson et al., 1986) it follows that S, u S2 u S, $ [recent, P]. Now, let 0: C3 -+ N E P be defined by
else.
We show that B aggregates each team (i, j, k) E S, u S, u S3 on P. For each index n E N one of the following cases arises:
(1) cpn~cpm so (Ph(n)=(Pa. Therefore each (i, j, k) E S1 u S2 u S, identifies (P,,, and so does lo.
(2) 4~~ g (P~ and (P,, s (Pi, then (e, f(n), f(n)) identifies q,,, and so does ~~.Wf, [~l, Mfc,,Col) . But (e, e, f(n)) and (e, g(n), S(n)) do not identify q,, .
(3) (Pn Y= (Pa and (Pn g (Ph(n), then none of the teams in S, u S, u S, identifies q,, .
It follows that S, u S2 u S3 E [pure, On]. 1
The result presented in this section together with the results already given in (Osherson et al., 1986) are as follows:
Where 2"' denotes the set of all subsets of N3.
III. AGGREGATION PRESERVING STRATEGY TYPES
A great variety of strategy types are defined in the literature on inductive inference, all of which restrict the kind of algorithms an inference machine can use in a certain way. We present a list of strategy types and investigate the question of whether the strategy type of the team members can be extended to the aggregator. For example, an inference machine of strategy type "weak' always converges, whereas a "strong" inference machine diverges it cannot identify the input function.
Obviously for all strategy types B c Z,
1. Non-uniform Methods In this section we are interested in the following question:
Given a strategy type B, for which kinds of information A is it possible to find an inference machine aggregating all teams in Ni and itself using a strategy of type B?
We will answer this question for weak, strong, and consistent strategies. In some of the following proofs we will use a function dE lR3, defined by graPh(cpai,j.,,) := kraph(cpi) ngraph(cpi)) u kwwh(cp,) n wph(cp,)) u kraPh(cpi) n (graphh)) for all i, j, k E N. This function has a useful property: LEMMA 3.3. If cp E P and at least two of the functions (pi, 'pi, qk E P are extensions of cp, then qdCi.j,k, is an extension of cp as well.
At first, we will examine the weak inference machines which were introduced by Brandt (1982) . For (i, j, k) E N :w and n, a step after which the three machines never change their hypotheses, M= Ja.6(Mi(a), Mj(a), M,(a)) will never change its hypothesis after step n,, either. Therefore M is weak.
Let @E o(i, j, k), then at least two of the limit hypotheses Q, b, c E N are indices for extensions of cp, and according to Lemma 3.3. (P~(~,~,~, extends q, too. Therefore M identifies $5. 1 DEFINITION 3.6. An inference machine M is called strong iff (V@ E p) M(G) 1 + cp G 'pwCCj, i.e., if M does not identify 6 then it diverges.
ZST := (ME I{ M is strong}.
Strong inference machines (also called "reliable") have been introduced by Minicozzi (1976) . Proof: We give a stepwise definition of an appropriate strategy. 8 tries to find a converging team machine and then outputs its hypothesis. At each step, (TV denotes the sequence of hypotheses so far given by the ith team member, iE (0, 1,2}. By k(a,, gi, CJ*)E (0, 1,2} we will mark the team member which is assumed to converge. k(a; , a;, a;) is abbreviated by k-.
Step n. If 3i 6 2 with lh(rr,) 6 1 then Qo,, cr,, CJ~) := 0, If M converges its limit hypothesis is equal to the limit hypothesis of a team member ZE IV,~,. Therefore M is strong. 1
On the other hand information of the kind "recent pure" does not suffice to aggregate teams in N&, on P, moreover not even on R. We prove this using a method of Osherson et al. (1986) . Choose n E N.
If cp"~cp,Y then (e, g(n), f(n)) identifies cp, E IR. Now, for M= ~c4KWy %+)(4, ~f(n,(4) and 0 E 2 @a, a, h(n))
Therefore it must hold that O(a, a, h(n)) = &a, h(n), h(n)), otherwise M would never converge and therefore not aggregate (e, g(n), f(n)) on [w, contradicting the supposition.
If (Pn P (Pa, then (Ph(n,f (Pa. On input @, the team (e, e, f(n)) which identifies qo, will output (a, a, h(n)) at each second step. Therefore q@,&(n)) = (Pi must hold with regard to the supposition. Analogously, on input @&) the team (e,f(n),f(n)) which identifies qhcnj will output (a, h(n), h(n)) at each second step, and consequently ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ = qhcnj It follows that @a, h(n), h(n)) # O(a, a, h(n)).
Therefore we could decide "cpn E cp O?" by comparing 0(a, a, h(n)) and @a, h(n), h(n)), contradicting the Rice's theorem. 1
We now want to examine consistent inference machines which have been defined by Wiehagen (1976) . ProoJ The proof is a slight modification of the one given for Proposition 3.7. We replace step n of the definition of 0: ,X3 -+ N by
Step n. If 3 6 2 with lh(a, The following diagram once again shows whether it is possible to find an A-preserving strategy of type B for the aggregation on C, CE {P, rW>: (1986) for N3 E [pure, R]. Let (i, j, k) E N3. For the definition of 0: ,X3 --+ N we use two markers a(aO, (or, a,), /?(o,, or, cr?)~ (0, 1,2} varying over the teams, and at each step marking those teams which are supposed to be the identifying ones. Moreover, for oO, or, rr2 EZ it is n :=lh(a,) +lh(a,) + lh(a,), CI-:=c(((T&, a;, a;), BP :=fl(o;, a;, a;), a :=last(a,-), and b := last(crg-). (c) The functions cpU, (Pi, cpr are pairwise contradictory. Then after the convergence of the team members witnesses for all these contradictions are eventually detected, so the markers do not move any longer. Therefore M converges.
It follows that A4 is weak. 1 PROPOSITION 3.14. [hypothesis, P] preserves the strong strategies.
Proof
We use the construction of 0 given in Theorem 2.2 with a little extension which ensures that the aggregator does not converge by mistake to an index which is not an extension of the input function.
A new case 2(a) is introduced and the old cases 2(a) and 2(b) are shifted to 2(b) and 2(c).
Case 2(a). (3O<i<j<2) such that last(a,)#last,(a,), and last(a,) # last,( a,). We now show that preservation is not possible for arbitrary strategy types. For this purpose we introduce the finite strategies which have been defined by Freivald and Wiehagen (1979) . DEFINITION 
M is called finite iff V@ E p and Vi, k E fW M(@[i] ) = M($[i+l])=>M(@[i])=M($[i+k]).
ZFZN := {ME I) M is finite}. It is not possible to find an inference machine which aggregates all the teams on (ID and which also preserves the finite strategies, not even if information of type "program" is used. 
IV. AGGREGATION FOR BC-AND EX*-IDENTIFICATION
Now two more general identification criteria are considered. BC-identification ("behaviorally correct") (Case and Smith, 1983) renounces convergence of the sequence of hypotheses given by an inference machine, whereas EX*-identification (Blum and Blum, 1975) allows finitely many discrepancies between the input function and the function denoted by the limit hypotheses of the inference machine. For these weakened identification criteria we examine two special kinds of aggregation, called direct and efficient aggregation, respectively. For EX-identifcation these kinds of aggregation have already been investigated by Osherson et al. As already mentioned, Pitt and Smith (1988) proved that each team of inference machines can be aggregated by a single inference machine if the majority of the team members have to identify the input for the team to be successful. While Pitt and Smith assume that the aggregating machine gets information of the kind "hypothesis" about the work of the team, we show that information of the kind "recent" is sufficient for the definition of a strategy 0 such that all teams can be BC-aggregated on P. 
It follows that q s 'Pd(M~(U5Cnl).M,(~Cnl).~~(~c~l)).
Therefore N3 = [IO, recent, P, BC]. 1
We now consider special kinds of aggregation already introduced by Osherson et al. (1986) . (0)) for iE{O, 1,2}. But no directly aggregating aggregator can identify more than two of the functions cpO, cp,, and (p2 using only information of the kind "pure," because, if he infinitely often outputs "a," then he cannot identify qr, etc. 1
We now turn to EX*-identification, which allows finitely many "errors" in the function denoted by the limit hypotheses of an inference machine. DEFINITION 4.9. Us P is EX*-identifiable by ME I iff (V$ E ii)
:= i exists, and (iii) cp c * 'pi, i.e., card( (x E dom(cp) 1 q(x) # q,(x)}) < co. EX* := { Ur P 1 U is EX*-identifiable}.
In the obvious way then also (i, j, k) EX*-identifies U, M EX*-aggregates (i, j, k) on U, and M is an EX*-aggregator; moreover, [0, A, U, EX*] and [A, U, EX*] are defined.
In Theorems 4.10 to 4.13 we present some results concerning EX*-aggregation on R and on P. They correspond to the results given for EX-aggregation (see Section II). However, it is still an open problem whether information of the kind "hypothesis" is necessary to EX*-aggregate all teams (i, j, k) E N3 on P. Proof A4 searches for two team members with limit hypotheses a and b, where q, and qb contradict each other only finitely often. Then one of them must EX*-identify the input function cp, and therefore also q c * (P~(~.~). Let co, err, CT~ EL. We define B(o,, CJ~, cz). In the definition, r((~,,, CJ~, a,) will coun; the number of contradictions between the hypotheses of the team members which can be detected in a certain number of steps. c1 and b mark those team members that are supposed to be the ones M searches for. Case 2. Not case 1, and last(a,-)#last,(cr,-), or last(aa-)# last,(oa-), or r #z-with r number of contradictions between (P,~~~(~.-,,~ and 4~~~,~(,~-) ,np where n = lb(a).
Then a((~~, ol, CJ := (CI-+ 1) mod 3; B(a,, ulr u2) := (fi-+ 1) mod 3; a := last(a,); b := last(as); z(eO, r~r, c2) := number of contradictions between (P~, ~ and (Pi, "; 8(a, , ul, u2) In the case of EX*-aggregation on P it seems to be necessary to use information of the kind "hypothesis," as two functions can be contradictory in infinitely many points while each of them only finitely often contradicts a third function if this is only partially defined. The argument is analogous to the one used in the proof of Theorem 1.1. Assume that (i, j, k) EX*-identifies $. If there are two converging team members with limit hypotheses a and 6, where cp E * qPh, then cp E * (P" (&) . Obviously, v(a, b) can be found in finitely many steps by an inference machine using strategy 8,. 1
As mentioned in Section II, Osherson et al. (1986) have shown that information of the kind "recent" is not sufficient to aggregate all teams on R. We will show that the same result holds for EX*-aggregation. The proof works along the lines of Osherson et al. (1986) . Then qn E qa iff (Ph(,,) = cpa, and if qn G& qa then (P,,(n) # * cpO, i.e., (Ph(,,) and rp, differ in infinitely many places. and we show that @a, a, h(n)) = O(a, h(n), h(n)): Team (e, g(n),f(n)) identifies cp,. Now, assume that e(u, a, h(n)) # &a, h(n), h(n)).
It follows that M does not converges for any 4 E P-in contradiction to the supposition that A4 EX*-aggregates (e, g(n), f(n)) on qa.
Case 2. (P,, @ cp,, so (PhCn)# * cpu, and we show that O(a, a, h(n))# O(a, h(n), h(n)): If M aggregates all teams on [w, then obviously (Pa g * (PC?(o.u.h(n,) and (Ph(n) E * (P6'(a,h(n),hln)).
But as qh(n) # * qa it is e(a, a, h(n)) # @a, h(n), h(n)).
As for all II E PV &a, a, h(n)) 1 and e(a, h(n), h(n))l, we can decide whether q,, E cpu by comparison of 6(a, a, h(n)) and @a, h(n), h(n))-in contradiction to the Rice' Proof: The proof of Theorem 2.5 works for EX*-identification. g DEFINITION 4.14. Let ME Z, Us P, and (i, j, k) E N3. M EX*-aggregates (i, j, k) on U directly iff M EX*-aggregates (i, j, k) on U, and tVqE O) tVnE N)E {"i(+Cnl)9 Mj(@Cnl)9 M/c(+'Cnl)).
For an inference machine M which Ex-identifies respectively EX*-identilies a function cp E P and an enumeration @, the point of identification is the smallest n,,~ N with (Vn >n,) M(
Therefore, for EX-identification and EX*-identification such an n, is called point of convergence, denoted by KP(M, @). Analogously to ZP(i, j, k, @), for a team (i, j, k) the point of convergence KP(i, j, k, @) is the smallest n, E N such that at least two of the team members have reached their point of convergence in step n,. Proof: Again the analogous result for EX-identification in (Osherson et al., 1986) can be used here, but with a slight modification.
We use cp,, M,, h E R, f E Iw as in the proof of Theorem 4.12, only g E R differs: Let S := {(e, f(n), g(n)) I n E N }. Suppose there is a p.r.f. 9: IV' x C --+ N with SG [e, program, efficient, R, EX*]; then again we would contradict Rice's theorem.
Let n E N. Then (e, f(n), g(n)) EX*-identifies (cp,, qhcnJ} E R.
Case 1. (P,, G rp,, therefore cp, = qhcnI. Let 6, be an enumeration of (Pi with $,[l] = (*, *). It follows that KP(e, f(n), g(n), 4,) =O. According to the supposition @(e, f(n), g(n), (*I) = e(e, f(n), g(n), (*, *)I. = (*, (0,O)). Again KP(e,f(n), g(n), 6;) =O, and CPA * 'P~(~,~(~),~(~,,(*,,. Now let GLcn) be an enumeration of vhcn) T;li Ghcn)[2] = (*, *, (x, y)), where x, y E N and y # 0. We, f(n), dn)v 4h(nJ = 1, and (P+) c * c~e(,,f(~).~(~),(*.*)). But cp, # * (PW, and therefore @e, f(n), g(n), (*I) Z e(e, f(n), g(n), (*, *)I.
Consequently we would have a decision procedure for "cp" c qp,?'-a contradiction to the Rice's theorem. 1
The following diagrams summarize the results concerning the three identification criteria considered in this paper-EX, EX*, and BC-as awe11 as general, direct, and efficient aggregation. As already mentioned in the introduction, all the theorems have been proved for teams with three elements for the sake of simplicity. But with one exception they also hold for teams with n members with n > 3, if we retain the definition that a team of inductive inference machines identifies a function iff the majority of the team members do so. In order to show how the proofs can be generalized to teams with n members we now present an example for the case "N" E . . . " as well as an example for the case "Nfl# . ..."
We need the following definitions: (1 O, . . . . i,-i) C-identities cp E P," "(iO, . . . . i,_ ,) C-identifies U E P," and "it4 C-aggregates (iO, . . . . i,, ,) on U" are defined correspondingly. There are at least k team members whose output sequences converge to an index of a function being an extension of cp E P; i.e., there is a step s E N where k team members identifying the input function have reached their point of convergence. Obviously there is a step t>s where each of the markers ~1~) . . . . tq identifies such a team member and therefore does not change its position any more. As k > 2 at least one of the team members identified by the markers is an inference machine which identifies the input Q5. So the hypothesis given by inference machine A4 which is computed using function ok is an extension of cp, too. As M does not change this hypothesis any more it identifies the input function q. It follows that inference machine aggregates the team (i1, . . . . i,,). 1
The example for the case "N" 4 . .." is the generalization of Theorem 2.4. Proof: Let n>3, HEN with n-2<h<n-1, and 8: C"+N be the strategy of a given inference machine M. We assume that 8 is a total recursive function, for the same reason as given in the proof of Theorem 2.4. Let cp,, (~~6 P be defined as just there, i.e., Again, we use diagonalisation over the actions of 8 to define a team of n members. The team identifies either cp, or qb, whereas 8 cannot identify either 'p, or 40~. The team consists of the inference machines defined in the proof of Theorem 2.4, namely Mi, Mj, Mk, where Mi converges to a, Mj converges to b, and Mk either diverges, or converges to u or to 6, depending on the behaviour of 8. The team contains h inference machines Mi, and h inference machines M,. If n is even it furthermore contains two inference machines M,. If n is odd there is only one inference machine M,. Now, if 8 working on the hypotheses computed by this team conveges to a, then Mk converges to b; therefore the majority of the team members identify 6, and vice versa. If 6' diverges it does not identify any function, but the team still identifies the function which is undefined on argument 0 and is zero everywhere else (cf. Theorem 2.4). 1
The exception to this is Theorem 3.20. This theorem cannot be generalized to teams with an arbitrary number of members but only to teams with more than four members. Namely, a team with four members using finite strategies can be aggregated by the following strategy 8 which even pure-preserves ZFZN: 8 waits till at least three members have reached their point of convergence. At least two of them-i.e., the majority-must identify the input. Therefore the aggregator can make use of de R3 to compute a correct limit hypothesis. Obviously, there is no equivalent strategy for the aggregation of teams with more than four members, so Theorem 3.20 holds for all teams with n members where n > 4. CONCLUSION We have presented several results concerning the amount of information needed for aggregating a team of inductive inference machines under various conditions. These results are supplementary to the ones given by Osherson et al. (1986) .
There 
